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MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE FRED 
T. KOREMATSU CENTER FOR LAW AND EQUALITY 
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(b), The Fred T. 
Korematsu Center for Law and Equality hereby submits this Motion for Leave to 
File a Brief Amicus Curiae in support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and Affirmance.1
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE AND REASONS WHY  
THE MOTION SHOULD BE GRANTED 
Amicus Curiae The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality 
(“Korematsu Center”) is a non-profit organization based at the Seattl University 
School of Law.  The Korematsu Center works to advance justice through research, 
advocacy, and education.  Inspired by the legacy of Fred Korematsu, who defied 
military orders during World War II that ultimately led to the unlawful 
incarceration of 110,000 Japanese Americans, the Kor matsu Center works to 
advance social justice for all.  The Korematsu Center does not, in this brief or 
otherwise, represent the official views of Seattle University. 
The Korematsu Center has a special interest in addressing government 
action toward persons based on race or nationality.  Drawing from its experience 
and expertise, the Korematsu Center has a strong interest in ensuring that courts 
understand the historical – often racist – underpinnings of doctrines asserted to 
support the exercise of such legislative and executive power. 
                                           
1 Plaintiffs-Appellees and Defendant-Appellants have consented to the filing 
of the proposed amicus brief.   
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The proposed Brief Amicus Curiae is being filed concurrently with consent 
of the parties now pending in this Court.  As the District Court concluded, 
“Fundamental to the work of this court is a vigilant recognition that it is but one of 
three equal branches of our federal government” and that it in determining whether 
to grant the Plaintiffs-Appellants Temporary Restraining Order it must review the 
Executive Order of January 27, 2017 entitled “Protecting the Nation from Foreign 
Terrorist Entry into the United States” (the “Executive Order”) “to fulfill its 
constitutional role in our tripart government.”  TRO Order at 7.    The Defendants-
Appellants maintain that this Court may not review the Executive Order, because 
the President has “unreviewable authority” to suspend admission of aliens to this 
country.  Emergency Motion under Circuit Rule 27-3 for Administrative Stay and 
Motion for Stay Pending Appeal (“Mot.”) at 2.  In Defendants-Appellants 
advancement of the plenary power doctrine in support of limiting the judicial 
branch’s authority to question any exercise of [his] executive power in this arena, 
the proposed Brief seeks to demonstrate that the plenary power doctrine derived 
from decisions like Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) 
(“Chinese Exclusion Case”) and its progeny, that were premised on outdated racist 
and nativist precepts that we now reject and outdated understandings of 
sovereignty.   We urge this Court to consider the historical conditions under which 
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the plenary power doctrine developed and justified prior historical developments 
which we now recognize as anathema. 
As the proposed Brief Amicus Curiae details, the influence of the plenary 
power doctrine has been steadily eroded in the immigration context.  Separately, 
but equally significant, the proposed Brief reviews the historical threads of cases 
that abdicated judicial review of executive and legislative actions against entire 
races or nationalities and provided judicial sanction of discriminatory action taken 
against disfavored minorities.   
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court should grant this Motion, and permit the 
Korematsu Center to file their concurrently submitted Brief Amicus Curiae.
Respectfully submitted, 
Dated:  February 5, 2017 AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & 
FELD LLP 
By  /s/ Jessica M. Weisel
Jessica M. Weisel 
1999 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 600 
Los Angeles, California  90067 
Telephone: (310) 229-1000 
Facsimile: (310) 229-1001 
Email: jweisel@akingump.com
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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
 Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and 29(c)(1), 
undersigned counsel for amici make the following disclosures: 
The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality is a research and 
advocacy organization based at Seattle University, a non-profit educational 
institution under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.  The Korematsu 
Center does not have any parent corporation or issue tock and consequently there 
exists no publicly held corporation which owns 10 percent or more of its stock. 
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INTEREST OF AMICUS 
Amicus Curiae The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality 
(“Korematsu Center”) is a non-profit organization based at the Seattle University 
School of Law.  The Korematsu Center works to advance justice through research, 
advocacy, and education.  Inspired by the legacy of Fred Korematsu, who defied 
military orders during World War II that ultimately led to the unlawful 
incarceration of 110,000 Japanese Americans, the Kor matsu Center works to 
advance social justice for all.  The Korematsu Center does not, in this brief or 
otherwise, represent the official views of Seattle University. 
The Korematsu Center has a special interest in addressing government 
action toward persons based on race or nationality.  Drawing from its experience 
and expertise, the Korematsu Center has a strong interest in ensuring that courts 
understand the historical – often racist – underpinnings of doctrines asserted to 
support the exercise of such legislative and executive power.1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The government maintains that this Court may not review the Executive 
Order of January 27, 2017, entitled “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist 
Entry into the United States” (the “Executive Order”), because the President has 
                                           
1 No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no 
person or entity other than amicus made a monetary contribution to its preparation 
or submission.  This brief is filed with the consent of all parties.See Motion for 
Leave to File Amicus Brief, filed concurrently. 
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“unreviewable authority” to suspend admission of aliens to this country.  
Emergency Motion under Circuit Rule 27-3 for Administrative Stay and Motion 
for Stay Pending Appeal (“Mot.”) at 2. That argument advances the plenary power 
doctrine, which, like the “separate but equal” doctrine, is a relic of an odious past 
that has no role in modern American jurisprudence.  Just as Plessy v. Ferguson was 
influenced by nineteenth century views anathema tody, the plenary power 
doctrine derives from decisions like Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 
581 (1889) (“Chinese Exclusion Case”), that were premised on outdated racist and 
nativist precepts that we now reject.
When confronted with a similar precedent in Brown v. Board of Education
of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Supreme Court recognized that it “cannot turn 
the clock back” and decide its former cases differently.  Instead, it would have to 
consider the subject of the law – public education in Brown, immigration policy 
here – “in the light of its full development and its present place in American life 
throughout the Nation.”  Id. at 492-93.  Consistent with that principle, courts have 
not given total deference to executive and legislative decisions on exclusion, but 
have engaged in appropriate judicial review.  As the District Court concluded: 
“Fundamental to the work of this court is a vigilant recognition that it is but one of 
three equal branches of our federal government” and that it must review the 
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Executive Order “to fulfill its constitutional role in our tripart government.”  TRO 
Order at 6-7.  This Court should do the same. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE WAS BORN OUT OF RACIST 
NOTIONS AND OUTDATED UNDERSTANDINGS OF 
SOVEREIGNTY THAT COURTS NOW REJECT. 
The birthplace of the plenary power doctrine, the Chinese Exclusion Case,
relies on racist descriptions of Chinese immigrants that stoked xenophobia.  The 
Court stereotyped Chinese laborers as “industrious,” “frugal” and “content with the 
simplest fare, such as would not suffice for our laborers and artisans.”  130 U.S. at 
595 (emphasis added).   These stereotypes informed the xenophobia of the opinion, 
driven by fear of “strangers in the land, residing apart by themselves, and adhering 
to the customs and usages of their own country”—whose presence amounted to 
“an Oriental invasion.”  Id.; see also id. at 606 (“the government of the United 
States, though its legislative department,” could lawfully “consider[] the presence 
of foreigners of a different race…who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous 
to its peace and security” despite the absence of “actual hostilities”) (emphasis 
added).
Justice Field’s acceptance of Congress’s conclusion that Chinese immigrants 
are incompatible with American society due to “differences of race” drove the 
outcome in plenary power doctrine cases, which are “inextricably linked” to the 
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idea of the “‘Other’ in America today, whether by virtue of race, ethnicity, national 
origin, religion, or citizenship status.”  Natsu Taylor Saito, The Enduring Effect of 
the Chinese Exclusion Cases: The Plenary Power Justification for On-Going 
Abuses of Human Rights, 10 Asian Am. L.J. 13, 13 (2003).   
Similar racist and xenophobic justifications pervade plenary power doctrine 
cases flowing from the Chinese Exclusion Case.  In these cases, the “right of self-
preservation” advanced as justification for the plenary power doctrine’s broad 
immunity in exclusion cases was racial self-preservation, not the preservation of 
borders or national security.E.g., Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 608; Saito 
at 15; see also, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 729-30 (1893) 
(discussing the requirement that Chinese aliens prove the fact of their U.S. 
residence “by at least one credible white witness” in order to remain in the 
country); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 664 & n.1 (1892) 
(exclusion of Japanese immigrant who was “likely to become a public charge”).2
These racial underpinnings have led courts to apply the plenary power doctrine, 
relying on an “aberrational form of the typical relationship between statutory 
                                           
2 Later cases do not explicitly discuss or express support for race-based 
distinctions, but do so implicitly through their reliance on the reasoning of the 
Chinese Exclusion Case and its progeny.See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. 
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953); United States  ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 
U.S. 537, 543 (1950). 
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interpretation and constitutional law” in the area of immigration law.  Hiroshi 
Motomura,Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom 
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 Yale L.J. 545, 549 (1990); 
see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the 
Constitution, 7 Constitutional Commentary 9, 33 (1990) (Chinese Exclusion laws 
“should serve as cautionary examples to those who would urge that the 
immigration power be left unconstrained by the Constitution in order to promote 
the maintenance of ‘communities of character.’”). 
 The overt racism of these cases contributes to an additional flaw in the 
doctrine – their reliance on an outdated and race-based meaning of sovereignty.  
TheChinese Exclusion Case states that “[t]he power of exclusion of foreigners” is 
“an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States . . . 
delegated by the [C]onstitution.”3  130 U.S. at 609.  Since then, the concept of 
sovereignty has evolved to incorporate principles of fundamental human rights and 
anti-discrimination, shifting the system “from the protection of sovereigns to the 
                                           
3  This same race-based concept of sovereignty is discussed at length in Dred
Scott v. Sandford, which explained that, historically, “negroes of African race” 
were not “constituent members of this sovereignty[.]”  60 U.S. 393, 403-04 (1856).  
Therefore, they had “none of the rights and privileges” that the Constitution 
“provides for and secures to citizens of the United States” but only “such as those 
who held the power and the Government might choose to grant them.”  Id. at 404-
05.
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protection of people.”See W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in 
Contemporary International Law, 84 Am. J. Int’l L. 866, 872 (1990).  This change 
is reflected in congressional action incorporating hese principles in federal law.  
See, e.g., Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. § 6501 
et. seq. (1998) (adopting UN Convention Against Torture and issuing related 
regulations, which prevent the U.S. government from e oving or extraditing an 
alien to a country where they may be subject to torture); International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res. 2106 (XX) 
(Dec. 21, 1965), ratified by 140 Cong. Rec. S7634 (daily ed. June 24, 1994); 
Motomura at 566 (“By the 1950s, aliens’ rights decisions beyond the scope of 
immigration law already conflicted with assumptions implicit in the plenary power 
doctrine.”).  These changes require reinterpretation, or modernization, of other 
norms to avoid “the absurdity of mechanically applying an old norm without 
reference to fundamental constitutive changes.”  Reisman at 873.
Perhaps reflective of the shift away from race-based characterizations and 
the outdated meaning of sovereignty, modern courts have refused to abdicate their 
power to judicially review immigration matters.  Relying on early dissents in 
plenary power cases, numerous lower courts have applied contemporary 
constitutional principles in reviewing immigration actions by the political 
branches.  After more than a century of erosion, the plenary power doctrine does 
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not appear to retain the support of a majority of justices on current Supreme Court.  
See Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) (in visa denial case, plurality opinion did 
not rely on plenary power); see also See Michael Kagan, Plenary Power is Dead! 
Long Live Plenary Power, 114 Mich L. Rev. First Impressions 21 (2015) (noti g 
that while the Court declined to repudiate the plenary power doctrine in Kerry v. 
Din, the split between the Justices suggests the doctrine is no longer as impactful 
as it once was).  Courts have not - and should not - abdicate their responsibility to 
uphold constitutional safeguards in the area of immigration. 
One of the earliest plenary power cases, Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 
U.S. 698, generated three dissenting opinions, eachof w ich highlighted a resident 
alien’s ties to the U.S. as a basis to justify greater legal protection.  See, e.g., Fong
Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 738 (Brewer, J. dissenting) (“I deny that there is any 
arbitrary and unrestrained power to banish residents, even resident aliens.”).
Justice Field – who announced the opinion of the court in the Chinese Exclusion 
Case – dissented in Fong Yue Ting.  Even while praising the Chinese Exclusion 
Case, upon which the majority relied to reach its holding, Justice Field sought to 
limit the plenary power doctrine’s application with regard to non-citizen residents:
As men having our common humanity, they are protected 
by all the guaranties of the constitution. To hold that they 
are subject to any different law, or are less protected in 
any particular, than other persons, is, in my judgment, to
ignore the teachings of our history, the practice of our 
  Case: 17-35105, 02/05/2017, ID: 10302882, DktEntry: 20-2, Page 13 of 21
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government, and the language of our constitution.
Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 754 (Fields, J. dissenting) (emphasis added). 
Nearly a century later, judicial skepticism regarding an unrestrained plenary 
power persisted.  Dissenting in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952), 
Justice Douglas drew on Justice Brewer’s dissent in Fong Yue Ting, arguing that 
the implied power of deportation should not be given priority over the express 
guarantee of the Fifth Amendment.  Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 599-600 (Douglas, J. 
dissenting).  Justice Douglas repeated Justice Brewer’s arning: 
 ‘This doctrine of powers inherent in sovereignty is one 
both indefinite and dangerous . . . The governments of 
other nations have elastic powers. Ours are fixed and 
bounded by a written constitution. The expulsion of a 
race may be within the inherent powers of a despotism. 
History, before the adoption of this constitution, was not 
destitute of examples of the exercise of such a power; 
and its framers were familiar with history, and wisely, as 
it seems to me, they gave to this government no general 
power to banish.’ 
Id. (Douglas, J. dissenting) (emphasis added).   
Along with Justices Black, Jackson, and Frankfurter, Justice Douglas 
supported limitations to the plenary power doctrine.  These Justices “expressed 
serious concern that aliens would be denied access to judicial review in such harsh 
and unremitting terms,” dissenting in influential McCarthy-era plenary power 
cases.  See Motomura at 560; see also Shaughnessy, 345 U.S. at 217 (Black, J. 
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dissenting) (“No society is free where government makes one person's liberty 
depend upon the arbitrary will of another. Dictatorships have done this since time 
immemorial. They do now.”); id. at 224 (Jackson, J. dissenting) (“I conclude that 
detention of an alien would not be inconsistent with substantive due process, 
provided – and this is where my dissent begins – heis accorded procedural due 
process of law.”). 
Over time, the dissents in Mezei, Knauff, and Harisiades gained influence, 
leading to “an expansion in the number and range of claims that courts, including 
the Supreme Court, would hear in immigration cases.”  Motomura at 560.  Lower 
courts have declined to abdicate review entirely and instead have applied “the 
rational basis test to substantive due process and equal protection challenges 
[arising from deportation]; . . . the traditional Mathews v. Eldridge factors to 
procedural due process challenges; and . . . First Amendment standards to 
[immigration] restrictions [arising out of] political speech and association.” 
Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, 
and the Courts, 22 Hastings Const. L.Q. 925, 934–35 (1995); see e.g., Reno v. 
Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (holding that despite the broad power of the 
political branches over immigration, INS regulations must meet the rational basis 
test by “rationally advancing some legitimate governmental purpose.”); Raya-
Ledesma v. I.N.S., 55 F.3d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding application of 
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residency requirement for discretionary relief from deportation had a rational basis 
and therefore did not violate legal permanent resident’s right to equal protection);
Tran v. Caplinger, 847 F. Supp. 469, 478-79 (W.D. La. 1993) (engaging in 
substantive due process analysis as to whether detention imposed was “merely 
incidental to another legitimate governmental purpose”); Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 
F.2d 1363, 1366 (5th Cir. 1987) (“We hold that even excludable aliens are entitled 
to the protection of the due process clause while tey are physically in the United 
States. . . .”). 
Thus, as these cases have implicitly recognized, courts are not required to 
defer completely to the exercise of executive or legislative power over immigration 
matters.
II. HISTORY REPUDIATES DECISIONS THAT ABDICATE JUDICIAL 
REVIEW OF EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS 
AGAINST ENTIRE RACES OR NATIONALITIES.
Perhaps it is not surprising that the Supreme Court that decided the Chinese
Exclusion Case had largely the same composition of the Court that upheld racial 
segregation under the doctrine of “separate but equal” in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 
U.S. 537 (1896).Plessy was, of course, overturned on Equal Protection grounds in 
Brown, 347 U.S. 483, and, like other cases that establish road authority to 
discriminate against entire races or nationalities, are now considered the nadir of 
American jurisprudence.
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Korematsu and Plessy are considered cases that “embod[y] a set of 
propositions that all legitimate constitutional decisions must be prepared to refute.” 
Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 379, 380 (2011); see also
Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 Sup. Ct. Rev. 303, 304 (1998) 
(“Commentators have called Plessy ‘ridiculous and shameful,’ ‘racist and 
repressive,’ and a ‘catastrophe.’”). 
 Like the government urges here, those decisions gave broad deference to the 
political branches of government to take action disfavored minorities.  History, 
however, has rejected judicial sanction of those actions.  Not only do we dismiss 
those cases as wrongly decided, we condemn those courts f r allowing racist views 
to go unchecked by the judiciary.See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 275 (1995) (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (describing the use of strict 
scrutiny in Korematsu to “yield[] a pass for an odious, gravely injurious racial 
classification . . .  A Korematsu-type classification . . . will never again survive 
scrutiny: Such a classification, history and precedent instruct, properly ranks as 
prohibited.”); Obadele v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 432, 441 (2002) (“Half a 
century of equal protection jurisprudence has confirmed the error of [Korematsu’s] 
wartime judicial abdication.”); see also Symposium: The Changing Laws of War: 
Do We Need A New Legal Regime After September 11?: The Constitution of 
Necessity, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1257, 1259 (2004) (complete “judicial 
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acquiescence or abdication” of performing checks on Presidential power “has a 
name.  That name is Korematsu”); Susannah W. Pollvogt, Beyond Suspect 
Classifications, 16 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 739, 748-51 (2014) (deferential standard of 
review applied in Plessy was “incapable of identifying and addressing 
contemporary prejudices”).
History would look similarly at this case and this Court if it allows the 
Executive Order to evade review.  Relying on the plenary power doctrine, a 
doctrine rooted in racism and xenophobia, to permit the Executive Order to stand 
will be seen for what it is – the judiciary’s abdication of its duty to stand as a 
bulwark against those who would undermine our core nstitutional principles. 
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should deny the emergency motion. 
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